African swine fever remains the greatest limitation to the development of the pig industry in Africa, and parts of Asia and Europe. It is especially important in West and Central African countries where the disease has become endemic. Biosecurity is the implementation of a set of measures that reduce the risk of infection through segregation, cleaning and disinfection. Using a 122-sow piggery unit, a financial model and costing were used to estimate the economic benefits of effective biosecurity against African swine fever. The outcomes suggests that pig production is a profitable venture that can generate a profit of approximately US$109,637.40 per annum and that an outbreak of African swine fever (ASF) has the potential to cause losses of up to US$910,836.70 in a single year. The implementation of biosecurity and its effective monitoring can prevent losses due to ASF and is calculated to give a benefit cost ratio of 29. A full implementation of biosecurity will result in a 9.70% reduction in total annual profit, but is justified in view of the substantial costs incurred in the event of an ASF outbreak. Biosecurity implementation is robust and capable of withstanding changes in input costs including moderate feed price increases, higher management costs and marginal reductions in total outputs. It is concluded that biosecurity is a key to successful pig production in an endemic situation.
Introduction
African swine fever virus infected the Nigerian pig population in 1997 with heavy mortalities and huge economic/social impacts (El-Hicheri, 1998) . Both the subsistence and commercial pig raising activities were severely disrupted by these infections. The virus continues to circulate causing sporadic or sometimes sustained infections in Nigerian pigs with further significant impacts on the swine industry (Babalobi, et al., 2007; Fasina et al., 2010) . Possible reasons for the persistence of the virus in the Nigerian pig population include continuous presence of persistently-infected and carrier sero-positive pigs on farms, uncontrolled breeding programmes, pig product movements, traders and middlemen operations and most importantly the lack of or poorly implemented biosecurity measures .
Field observations and opinion polls of some 95 smallholder pig farmers [Mean herd size =71, Range = 5-450 pigs; 1st quartile = 17; 3rd quartile = 84] in parts of Nigeria revealed a huge deficiency in the understanding and implementation of basic concepts of biosecurity at farm level. These farmers despite reporting implementation of principles of hygiene in their farms and having experienced shared infections continued to keep/sell survivor pigs, slaughtered infected pigs on their premises, visited infected premises and slaughter slabs within the communities without taking precautionary measures, sometimes shared equipment, permitted the entrance of farm-gate buyers into the farm premises and did not make an effort to ascertain the ASF status in their immediate community.
P r o f i t a b i l i t y ( t h e e x c e s s o f i n c o m e s o v e r e x p e n s e s ) r e m a i n s t h e p r i n c i p a l d r i v e r f o r
involvement in pig rearing, hence the understanding of this factor and its use in the introduction and maintenance of principles of biosecurity at farm level becomes important for controlling ASF at farm level, most especially in the small to medium scale piggeries and farming communities.
Furthermore, for the farmers to take a decision to implement and provide sustained support for disease management programs like ASF, financial considerations (profit and or benefit arising from such a decision) is often important, in addition to the following factors:
· Additional workload on the workers and whether this can be adopted easily into the current farm operations · Complexities in changes in management procedures due to the new protocols · Requirements for increased levels of investment · Cheaper alternatives that achieve the same proposed solution (biosecure environment)
· Availability of funds and means to implement the proposed measures · Commitment of staff including necessary training, understanding of the risk of infection and its severity, · Incentives to offset the burden placed on workers to ensure proper implementation and secure their involvement · Cost of compliance and monitoring following implementation · Laws and regulations that permit or negate such proposed intervention Based on the above, an understanding of total cost determination is the critical starting point for any positive intervention to be implemented at farm level. For any intervention to survive the keen competitive environment of limited resources, the value or benefit must be clear and the application easy and suited to the local conditions. The use of economics has been advocated as an effective tool in the management of transboundary animal diseases and a previous study has demonstrated that the understanding of economics of animal diseases including the management and intervention options at herd-level remains a key strategy for rapid implementation of animal disease control (Marsh, 1999; FAO, 2001) . Babalobi et al. (2007) previously investigated the cost implications of ASF outbreaks in south-west Nigeria using a cost analysis, but to date, no farm level study has been conducted to determine the impact and benefits of intervention in smallholder operations. Benefit-cost analysis represents the most comprehensive standard financial analysis to evaluate animal disease situations with positive outcomes (Marsh, 1999; Tambi et al., 1999; Tisdell, 1999; FAO, 2001 ).
The aim of this study was to estimate the profitability of biosecurity implementation using a 122-sow farrow-to-finish pig farm model to determine the benefit-cost effects of required interventions. The results are expected to serve as basic guidelines to assist farmers in measuring profitability of farm operations so that they can make informed decisions regarding biosecurity implementation in against the backdrop ofmany competing financial interests.
Materials and method

Choice of farm
Selected farms were visited and evaluated including small-scale operators (<100-sow units), medium-scale operators (101 to 250-sow units) and large-scale operators (>250-sow units) to compare and contrast production parameters and industry standards. Standardized production data were collected using available literature (Carr, 1998; Stalder et al., 2011) and farm data were collated by personal interviews with farmers and careful examination of farm records. Farm data were further confirmed with pig farm consultants and assessed against published data to check for consistency. Critical values where farmers/consultants need to intervene to ensure optimum productivity were also determined and are presented in Table 1 . Based on economic feasibility and detailed records of farm operations, a 122-sow farrow-to-finish unit producing porkers (70kg liveweight pigs) was ultimately selected for the model.
Identification of risk factors associated with African swine fever virus introduction
When considering possible means of disease introduction, the following were identified as potential routes for African swine fever virus introduction:
· Soft-shelled eyeless ticks (Ornithodoros moubata complex) present in the community. This vector has never been implicated in the outbreaks of ASF in West Africa. However, a recent study indicates the presence of an Ornithodoros species that m ay play a role in the epidemiology of ASF in West Africa (Vial et al., 2007) .
· Warthogs, bushpigs, red-river hogs presence. All three wild suid species occur in the West African sub-region (Jori & Bastos 2009 ). Contact with domestic pigs kept under intensive management is, however, unlikely.
New intervention costs
Effectiveness of intervention
No intervention: less costly, not effective, more losses · Inadequate access to quality veterinary services and advice.
· Biosecurity lapses in cleaning, disinfection and decontamination.
· Lack of compensation for culled animals.
Based on the above ASF infection risk factors for a 122-sow farrow-to-finish pig farm, the biosecurity measures considered in this study were included to ensure maintenance of a closed herds, easy integration into current farming practices, enhanced farm operations that instil pride in workers, certification to ensure that animal entering and leaving the farm are free of infection, prevention of direct contact with possible infected sources (ticks, wild pigs and free-range pigs), prevention of indirect contact (formites, tools, tyres etc), prevention of within-farm (pen-to-pen) and inter-farm/inter-site spread of infection Specifically, the following biosecurity measures were considered to be applicable to the pig farms:
Segregation: Erection of fence and gate, control and monitoring of physical barrier, enforcement of change of footwear and clothing, and restricting the entry of vehicles or dipping of tyres in case of necessary entrance.
Cleaning: Daily sweeping, routine washing of the pen with copious amount of water, thorough washing with soap, water and brush to ensure that no visible dirt is seen on the surface of building and materials, dry cleaning of all material that are not water-resistant.
Disinfection:
Usage of appropriate disinfectant to sanitize washed and dry-cleaned materials (FAO, 2010) . The costs of the selected items above are presented in Table 7 .
These costs were determined from details available from the farms.
Parameters and assumptions
The parameters and figures used in the calculations are available in Table 1 and the assumptions used are listed below: Mean annual cost per kilogramme of meat from culled sows (at 74 -75% meat from live weight, a 250kg boar will yield ≈185kg of pork) US$1.35/kg Mean annual cost per kilogramme of meat from culled boar (at 75 -77% meat from live weight, a 280kg pig will yield ≈210kg of pork) US$0.45/kg *Parameters with asterisk (*) indicate that the values from the used farm are either too high or too low. In such circumstances, standard values from the target were substituted for used farm values. Production parameters were adapted using Carr, (1998) ; Stalder et al., (2010) 1. Each sow will produce an average of 10.25 piglets per litter and wean 9.75 piglets.
A 2% case of stillborn/mummies will occur per sow on average in the farm (Table   1) .
2. All cases of sudden death for the period of the assessment will be directly as a result of ASF or causes associated with it. ASF will ultimately lead to 100% mortality in infected farms either due to direct mortality caused by the disease or stamping-out policy implemented on the farm.
3. The sow will be replaced after the sixth parity and at an average age of ≈ 3 years.
The boar will be replaced after 2 years of age.
4. Each porker will have a finishing liveweight of ≈ 70kg at 150 days. Culled sows will have a liveweight of ≈ 250kg while the culled boar will have a liveweight of ≈ 280kg. The prevailing price of prime cut for porkers of US$2.47, culled sow (US$1.35) and culled boars (US$0.45) will remain constant.
5. The lifespan of a standard fence erected will be 20 years. Depreciation is calculated using linear equation and mean valuation (1x + 2x + 3x + 4x +5x + 6x + 7x + 8x + 9x + 10x………… 20x) whereas the total value of such materials will be divided by the lifespan of the materials and the mean value will be deducted in each year. The value of the fence will be zero after 20 years and that of the cemented tyre dip will be zero after the 10th year.
6. Depreciation in stock values was determined by deducting the final market value of each stock from the initial value and dividing the total loss of value over 6-monthly periods (Table 2 ).
7. Since it is known that the outbreak can occur at any period during the operational year, a mid-year value was obtained and used for all farm stock. 8. Implementation of biosecurity will be 100% effective against the risk of infection with ASF.
Profit was assessed by deducting all input values and costs from output values and incomes (Tables 3, 4 & 5) . Year outputs per input as well as operation mean year total over a threeyear period were also calculated. Details of the calculations are available in tables 3-5.
Assuming that African swine fever outbreak will cause massive mortality approaching 100%, or that the remaining stock will be depopulated following an outbreak, a potential loss associated with ASF was calculated and is presented in table 6. The bases for the calculations are available as footnotes to the tables. F r o m t h e a b o v e c o s t s , v a l u e s a n d o u t p u t s , t h e b e n e f i t c o s t a n a l y s i s ( B C A ) o f implementation of biosecurity against ASF was evaluated and presented.
Sensitivity analysis
Since the annual farm operation exists in a dynamic environment and changes in other variables may affect the annual profitability of farm operations and consequently that of the BCA, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the effect of biosecurity implementation on overall profitability in the event that:
1. Cost of biosecurity increases by 100%, 2. Feed price increases by 30 up to 75%, 3. Management cost (input costs excluding feed) increases by between 25 and 75%, and 4. Total margins from outputs are reduced by 10 up to 25%.
Results
Profitability of the 122-sow farrow-to-finish farm and losses associated with potential ASF infection
The annual mean costs of operation was US$295,075.80 and feed costs accounted for 71.99% of the total variable costs while fixed costs represented 31.13% of the total costs (Table 3) . Labour cost accounted for 86.30% of the total fixed cost in this study. A mean output of US$404,713.30 was generated and the porkers (weaner grown in the farm to finisher stage) accounted for 82.38% of this total output (Table 4) . Annual profit gradually increased from US$107,923.70 to US$111,126.30 over a three year period with a mean annual profit of US$109,637.40 (Table 5) .
Should ASF infect a non-biosecure farm in the first year of operation, the farm will lose a total of US$910,836.70. It should be noted that part of this amount does not represent real incomes since the whole sum is inclusive of potential incomes associated with the expected outputs from the farm in the second and third years of operation. If the infection occurs in the second year, there is a possibility of losing up to US$579,312.50 while an infection of the farm in the third year will result in the loss of approximately US$233,690.70 (Table 6 ).
The losses will include the costs of wasted inputs (feeds, veterinary costs, drugs, vaccines, transportation, bills and utilities), clean-up costs, pay-off to staff, facility rental cost, and some maintenance costs in addition to real and potential outputs expected from the farm. US$29, 105.83, US$19, 873.21 and US$10, 178.96 respectively. The mean cost of Biosecurity over the three year period was US$9, 701.94 Benefit of biosecurity against African swine fever compared to no-biosecurity using benefit-cost analysis (BCA)
The benefit cost ratio (BCR) of implementing biosecurity in a 122-sow farrow-to-finish unit can be determined in one of two ways: was assumed that no pig will be left after infection by ASF either due to ASF-associated mortality or stamping out policy.
Where the:
Increase in net incomes = profit retained, downtime cost saved, wasted feed and labour and other costs saved.
Decrease costs of operation = cost of disease management and clean-up costs.
Decrease in net incomes = extra costs of implementing biosecurity Increase cost of operation due to biosecurity = assumed profit saved without biosecurity, value of total animal saved without biosecurity.
Since it was assumed that ASF will cause 100% mortality, the BCR of no-biosecurity will amount to zero because no animal will be saved for evaluation purposes. However, the BCR of biosecurity against an infection of ASF in the first year of operation will be US$910,836.70/US$29,105.80) = 31.29
In the second year of operation, this value of biosecurity implementation against ASF is US$579, 312.50/US$19, 873.20 = 29.15 In the third year of operation, this value will be US$233,690.70/US$10,179.00 = 22.96
Over a three year operation, the BCR of biosecurity against ASF will be: US$ (910, 836.70 + 579, 312.50 + 233, 690.70)/ US$(29, 105.80 + 19, 873.20 + 10, 179 .00) = US$1,723,839.90/US$59,158.00 = 29.14
Sensitivity analysis
The inclusion of biosecurity in the farm operation will reduce the mean annual profit by 9.70%, however, this is justified in view of the potential benefit of 29 times expected over a three year period compared to not implementing biosecurity. If the cost of biosecurity increases by 100%, the mean annual profit will reduce by 19.42% while a 30% increase in cost of feed will reduce the mean annual profit by 33.86%. A 25% increase in cost of other variable and fixed costs will reduce the profit by 40.52% while a 75% increase in these costs will lead to loss of 102.14% (total loss of profit and an addition of 2.14%). If the incomes from the outputs are reduced by 10%, there will be a 50.21% loss in profit while a 25% loss in total outputs will lead to a loss of 110.95% of profit (Table 8) . Tables 3, 5 and 7) .
Discussion
In this study, we have demonstrated the profitability of a 122-sow pig farm and described an economic approach to preventing ASF virus infection at farm level. We are aware that farm profitability may not always be based on optimum productivity as the interplay of various factors may affect farm operations and lower maximum profitability; this effect is reduced in this analysis by the use of real farm data as the template to simulate
profitability. An attempt to examine the cost effectiveness of intervention using biosecurity and a situation of no intervention for a probable African swine fever virus infection of the 122-sow unit indicated that intervention at farm level using biosecurity to prevent the introduction of ASF was far more effective than taking no action (benefit-cost ratio: 29.14).
Since ASF is currently endemic in Nigeria and in most of the West African states, and no vaccine is available to control the disease, it will be important to focus on preventing ASF infection using biosecurity. It should however be borne in mind that prevention of outbreaks of a disease like ASF is an interplay of diverse factors, including the effectiveness of biosecurity. Despite the fact that the facilities and tools needed for the implementation of farm-level biosecurity will come at a cost, the investment is justified in view of the outcomes that are derived from implementation of these measures.
Furthermore, some of these facilities including fencing and tyre dips will be useful for a long time and for other purposes other than biosecurity. While the study focused on the benefit of biosecurity in preventing ASF infection alone, the biosecurity implementation will also prevent other infectious diseases like foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever (CSF), Aujeszky's disease, swine vesicular disease (SVD), porcine circoviruses (PCV) and porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRS).
Thus, the total overall benefits of biosecurity are likely to far outweigh the cost benefit analysis done in this study.
Babalobi and colleagues (2007) had previously described a combined mortality of over 91% in 306 pig farms in southwest Nigeria, and field observation has confirmed similar figures. A situation of this magnitude will come with loss of trade, redundancy of facility, psychosocial stress on the farmer and the potential to infect neighbouring farms. The cost of destruction of the remaining pigs and burying, as well as the disinfection of the farm following outbreaks of ASF will also add to the burden of ASF virus infection. The information provided by the result of this work will guide sound decision-making related to the allocation of funds to biosecurity implementation, in the face of other competing interests.
The benefit-cost analysis of biosecurity indicates that it is justified on economic grounds.
In the smallholder farms survey earlier mentioned, we confirmed that there have been several/repeated outbreaks of ASF and currently, there are a combined total of less than 100,000 pigs in the survey area, the ASF status of which is unknown to the farmers.
However, the recent findings of Fasina et al. (2010) revealed that the prevalence of ASF on the farms is very high (50% seropositivity and 97% positive for ASF virus genome).
Although we used a value of 100% mortality to calculate our values in this analysis, other workers have reported similar or lesser percentages of mortality in severe cases (Dixon et al., 1994; Penrith et al., 2004; Bastos et al., 2004; Babalobi et al., 2007) , and we are aware that less acute forms of ASF exist, a situation that may perpetuate itself in pig farms and cause reduced but continuous economic losses . It is our opinion that biosecurity at farm level will be better than no intervention irrespective of the form of ASF virus infecting a farm.
The sensitivity analysis of this model has proved that even with the inclusion of biosecurity in the farm operation, the proposed project will survive the additional variations that may cause foreclosure. A 100% increase in cost of biosecurity will cause a 19.42% reduction in profit (US$19, 403.90) and this may save a potential value of US$910,836.70 in stock and farm operations. However a greater than 50% increase in cost of feed as well as an output margin reduced by 15% or more will have a negative effect on the implementation of biosecurity at farm level. It is unlikely that this margin of increase on feed cost will happen without government intervention in view of the similar food resources required by humans and pigs.
Although the focus of this study is on economic analysis alone, other forms of losses which can not be quantified in economic terms exist. The psychosocial stress, loss of health and human (pig farmers) death following the complete loss of livelihood is difficult to quantify. If it were possible to quantify the above impacts economically, we believe that the benefit-cost of biosecurity would rise significantly.
This model of biosecurity herein reported can be favourably implemented at smallholder farm-level since it is easily adaptable, less costly and socially acceptable (Ekue and Wilkinson, 1990) . This model if combined with good management practices will be of tremendous benefit to the farmers. It should be possible to train extension agents, veterinarians and government agricultural workers to communicate the message of biosecurity, including its financial benefit to pig farmers. The use of community leaders and cooperative unions may also assist in this regard. Finally, a case of ASF on a farm, if left uncontrolled will result in a huge loss of investment on a national scale since interfarm and inter-regional spread is inevitable (Mannelli et al., 1997) .
